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FOREWORD 
ADJUDICATING THE GUILTY MIND 
SAMUEL W. BUELL* AND LISA KERN GRIFFIN** 
Criminal law seems to continue always on its long march, which began at 
least in the distant reaches of the English common law, toward more 
particularized and theorized doctrines of mental state. In a growing class of 
cases in criminal adjudication in the United States today, liability turns hardly at 
all on the act done or the harm caused. Instead, the conception, definition, and 
resolution of many cases focus on questions about the defendant’s thoughts and 
intentions. With white collar offenses such as fraud, corruption, and 
obstruction, for example, the victim is often a constructed one. Culpability turns 
not on what “really happened” to the financial markets, or the body politic, or 
the investigative process, but on the formation of a guilty state of mind. 
Defining mens rea clearly and adjudicating it accurately have long been 
problems where the law requires separation between knowing and hapless 
actors, or between states such as premeditation and heat of passion. But old 
puzzles have taken on new significance as the criminal justice system advances 
into more realms occupied predominantly—sometimes completely—by the 
question of the guilty mind. 
The May 2011 “Adjudicating the Guilty Mind” conference at Duke 
University School of Law started from the premise that making dispositive 
mental state determinations requires greater sophistication with respect to both 
substance and procedure. That conversation, like the Symposium issue that 
follows, sought to bring different methodologies and perspectives to bear on the 
difficult question of how the public perceives culpability, how the law defines it, 
and how the justice system identifies it in a given case. Looking through various 
lenses—including social and cognitive psychology, moral philosophy, 
economics, and empirical studies of jury decisionmaking and judicial 
behavior—the authors offer new ideas about what the criminal law’s 
increasingly heavy reliance on mental state means and requires.1 
The conversation begins with the question of what a culpable mind consists 
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 1.  The authors here were joined at the conference by many participants who lent their substantial 
expertise in these fields, and related ones such as neuroscience, cultural theory, behavioral economics, 
and substantive criminal law. We particularly thank Sara Sun Beale, Don Braman, James Coleman, 
Nita Farahany, Owen Jones, Richard McAdams, Theresa Newman, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and 
Neil Vidmar for their contributions to the discussion.  
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of, in terms of how laypersons observe and understand wrongdoing itself. Janice 
Nadler’s article, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and 
Moral Emotion on Blame, evaluates how perceptions of moral character relate 
to conclusions about culpable mental state. Nadler reports experimental 
findings that more blame falls on a person with a flawed moral character than 
one perceived as virtuous, even holding actions and the consequences of those 
actions constant. Legal judgments of culpability thus interact with negative 
moral emotion, and particularly the extent to which a defendant is viewed as a 
“bad person.” This result obtains not only for flaws like drug addiction and 
abusive parenting but also for mildly undesirable traits like unreliability. 
Increased moral emotion in turn leads to more punitive attributions of blame, 
both within the legal system and outside of it. Moreover, moral emotion affects 
decisions about causation and intent. Nadler further finds that when character 
differences are made explicit, inferences about general virtuousness have less 
influence on perceptions of blame. Nadler, with others in this discussion, raises 
serious challenges to the criminal law’s project of using mental state definitions 
to discipline adjudication, while forcing us to examine our assumptions about 
the nature of the inputs into conventional conceptions of mental state. 
Moral intuitions have particular salience in the realm of white collar 
offenses, where the conduct itself may be morally ambiguous, and the line 
between criminal and noncriminal conduct is most difficult to draw. Stuart 
Green and Matthew Kugler report an empirical study asking different questions 
that are nonetheless similarly freighted with the social process that constructs 
culpability. In Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime Culpability: Bribery, 
Perjury, and Fraud, they query how community attitudes with respect to white 
collar offense conduct relate to the legal distinctions between crimes. Their 
experiments use factual scenarios drawn from the elements of fraud, perjury, 
and bribery offenses. According to their findings, moral intuitions about the 
boundaries between criminal and noncriminal behavior do not correlate with 
current doctrinal distinctions. Although subjects can make fine distinctions 
about culpability, only some of their instincts find expression in legal doctrine. 
With respect to perceptions of fraudulent conduct, the notion that core 
misrepresentations are more blameworthy than extraneous ones is consistent 
with a line that the law itself draws. But when it comes to the contours of the 
perjury offense, respondents do not concur in the doctrinal distinction between 
“literally false” and “literally true but misleading” statements. Lay observers 
perceive closer equivalence between lying in court and lying during 
investigations than the law recognizes. Green and Kugler also report that moral 
intuitions are expansive with respect to corruption. Commercial bribery and 
payments to public officials in exchange for non-official acts appear equivalent 
to bribery, even though neither falls within the current scope of federal 
prohibitions. 
The discord between moral intuitions and legal line drawing underscores the 
importance of striving to clearly and carefully define offenses that capture an 
appropriate level of culpability. In Corrupt Intentions: Bribery, Unlawful 
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Gratuity, and Honest-Services Fraud, Alex Stein critiques the doctrinal 
boundaries that apply to a particular cluster of white collar offenses. He argues 
that the Supreme Court has mistakenly limited the scope of its interpretations 
of the statutes criminalizing bribery, gratuity, and honest-services fraud, by 
excluding a variety of off-market transactions that benefit public officials and 
private individuals at the government’s expense. Stein contends that a necessary 
and sufficient corrupt state of mind can be inferred from the economics of a 
transaction. Any exchange with what he terms a “two-sided off-market benefit” 
necessarily contains the intent to give and receive a bribe or unlawful gratuity. 
That intent makes criminal sanction appropriate because it introduces a force or 
artifice to the transaction that market mechanisms cannot control. This 
economic understanding of the offense and Stein’s market-focused criterion 
offer one approach to identifying clear signals of a guilty mind that can define 
liability in a traditionally murky area of the law. 
Kim Ferzan considers the guilty mind in terms of cognitive capacity, 
evaluating the distinction between intention and premeditation with the tools of 
analytic philosophy. Her primary focus is not the morally ambiguous terrain of 
white collar offenses but the question whether the most culpable killings are 
those in which the guilty mind includes premeditation. In Ferzan’s view, the 
premeditation concept is not capable of adjudicating culpability, and Plotting 
Premeditation’s Demise imagines a spectrum of culpability that would better 
account for the nature of decisionmaking in the relative evaluation of 
homicides. Premeditation, she argues, is both over and under-inclusive in terms 
of capturing the most culpable actors. Intent formation of any kind involves 
some additional deliberation, and that closely resembles premeditation. As a 
result, lawmakers have failed to define premeditation adequately, and fact 
finders struggle to apply the distinction consistently. Culpability is better 
understood, in Ferzan’s view, as something that can be graded according to a 
variety of factors that increase responsibility for bad choices. Although 
premeditation speaks to the amount and timing of an actor’s deliberation, it 
does not address the level of indifference involved. Considering instead the 
gravity of risks imposed, the reason for imposing them, the defendant’s attitude 
toward the killing, and the nature and extent of a defendant’s reasoning process 
would better address retributivist goals. 
Darryl Brown’s article shifts the focus from the substance of mens rea 
standards, and their application by factfinders, to judicial failure to determine 
which elements of crimes, particularly federal crimes, carry mens rea elements 
at all. Despite the widely held view that punishment ought to be proportional to 
fault—and that one who intends a bad result demonstrates more fault than one 
who intends conduct but not the result it causes—Brown explains that federal 
courts largely interpret statutes to impose mens rea requirements only as a 
question of threshold culpability, or eligibility for punishment, and then 
disregard mental state when it comes to the magnitude of punishment. Mens rea 
requirements thus apply only to some elements of an offense, with other 
elements treated as imposing strict liability even if those elements have 
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substantial normative significance. In Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the 
Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, Brown explores this inconsistency through a 
close analysis of several cases, a contrary approach taken by the Supreme Court 
in a recent case extending a mental state requirement to all significant offense 
elements, statutory drafting conventions, and canons of statutory construction. 
He observes that conflicting rules and incompatible institutional preferences 
about the strength and scope of mens rea elements relate to longstanding 
puzzles and debates in the criminal law, such as the moral luck problem. More 
reliable interpretive practices, Brown concludes, could both give better effect to 
congressional intent and rest the content of federal criminal statutes on more 
normatively sound accounts of culpability. 
The article that we co-authored, On the Mental State of Consciousness of 
Wrongdoing, describes and examines a trend in white collar adjudication to 
respond to difficulties of definition and line drawing by requiring that an actor 
have been “conscious of wrongdoing” before imposing criminal liability. 
Evaluating awareness of wrongdoing captures many of the moral intuitions 
explored by Nadler, and Green and Kugler; the quality of deliberation concept 
that Ferzan emphasizes; and some of the normative commitments that Brown 
explores as well. This mens rea tool can usefully disentangle white collar offense 
conduct from the benign or beneficial economic activity in which it is often 
embedded. And using consciousness of wrongdoing as a sorting mechanism 
arguably fits with justifications for and principles of punishment sounding in 
blameworthiness, deterrence, and notice requirements. In application, however, 
a consciousness of wrongdoing standard confronts difficulties with evidence and 
narrative-based decisionmaking. Factfinders tend to construct mental states 
from preexisting paradigms of wrongdoing and to rely on their own experiences 
and emotions. The consciousness of wrongdoing concept licenses the creation of 
templates for wrongful conduct and stories of moral failing that may pose 
particular dangers to accuracy. It is precisely when mental state does the most 
work—marking the only boundary between criminal and noncriminal 
conduct—that the hazards of associative factfinding loom largest. We suggest, 
however, that clarity about the content of a consciousness of wrongdoing 
element, and attention to the mechanics of introducing and reviewing evidence 
of its presence in a given case, could mitigate these concerns. 
Dan Simon asks still broader questions about whether the process of 
adjudication functions with the precision and accuracy that imposing criminal 
punishment requires. In More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited 
Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, Simon reviews the psychological research 
on decisionmaking and identifies failures in several mechanisms thought to 
heighten accuracy: cross-examination, jury instructions, jurors’ assurances of 
impartiality, burdens of proof, jury deliberation, and appellate review. Each of 
these points in the trial, he argues, has limited effectiveness and the occasional 
detrimental effect. He attributes the poor diagnosticity of the trial to factors 
such as informational asymmetry on cross; the contorted language of 
instructions; the failure to provide factfinders with examples, written 
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instructions, and the opportunity to deliberate before voting; and the need for 
mechanisms apart from instructions, such as more careful screening of extra-
evidential information before it reaches the jury. Simon also advocates more 
transparent investigations and suggests that epistemic competence turns on 
interactions far earlier in the process. His comprehensive look at the failure to 
assure accuracy underscores the acute systematic difficulty in correctly 
constructing, labeling, and recognizing mens rea. 
As with many such projects, the rich conversation that unfolded at the 
conference and the articles published here do much more to frame the 
challenges than to provide solutions. Decisionmaking in the criminal justice 
system—about whether to punish and about how much to punish—turns 
increasingly on inquiry into the mind. Each of these articles, from different 
perspectives, illustrates the importance of understanding what a guilty mind is 
or should be, translating those insights into legally operational concepts, and 
improving the accuracy with which legal actors treat the ever-growing class of 
criminal cases that pivot on states of mind. 
 
